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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS B.

~lOONEY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
CASE

No. 7373

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S RE·PLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Since the filing of appellant's original brief, decisions have come down which we believe are decisive of
the i:ssues presented on this appeal. Certain statements
made by respondent in its brief require answer. For
these reasons we have concluded to write a short reply
brief.
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A-RGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT PROHIBITS STATE COURTS FROM DISMISSING ACTIONS ON
THE GROUNDS OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

Under Point I of its brief respondent makes the
startling contention that by the very language of Section
6 of the, Federal Employers' Liability Act fede~~l c01i~t~
only are required to accept ju~isdiction of actions
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
In other worqs, respondent contends that the provisions
of Section 6 that an action inay be brought in the District
of the residence of defendant, or h~ which the cause_ of
&ction arose, or in which the deferid~~t shaJi be doing
business at the time of commencing such action, are
applicable to federal courts only. Respondent thus
eliminates from the act the provision that "The Jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this
chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of
the several states.''
We submit that ever since the enactment of this
statute it has been uniformally interpreted and construed
to mean that actions under the F .E.L.A. may be brought
in state courts of jurisdiction whenever and wherever
one or more of the three permissive factors for jurisdiction exist. Fot instance, an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act may be brought in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a court of general
jurisdiction whenever,
(1) The defendant resides in Salt Lake County;
or
(2) The cause of action arose in Salt Lake County: or
(3) The defendant shall be doing business in Salt
Lake County at the time of the commencement
of such action.
To hold otherwise would require the elimination of
the foregoing quoted portion of the F.E.L.A.
At page 25 of its brief respondent contends that
since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a) and the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ex
Parte Collett, 69 S. Ct. 944, the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, has been vitiated with respect to its application
to an action brought in a federal court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In the first place, we
are not here concerned with an action brought in a Federal District Court, but are concerned with an action
brought in a district court of this state. The enactment
of Section 1404(a) could not possibly have ahy application to state courts. That section is applicable only to
federal courts and provides as follows:
''For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The only remedy sought by respondent in the case
at bar was dismissal of the action and not a transfer
to some other court. Obviously a Utah Court could not
effectively transfer this action to a Colorado Court or
to a Delaware Court or to a Federal Court. In the very
recent Missouri case of State of Missouri, at the Relation
of Southern Railway Company, a corporation, v. Waldo
C. Mayfield, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis, Missouri, and His Successors, as Presiding Judge
of said Court, 224 S.W. 2d 105, it was held that the
foregoing quoted section of the United States Code has
no application to an action brought in a state court.
For the convenience of the court we are setting forth
in Appendix ''A'' of this brief the Court's opinion in full.
Another thing to be observed is that the decision in
the Kepner case is based squarely upon a construction
of Section 6 of the F.E.L.A., and the Collett case states
that Section 1404(a) does not repeal that section.
1404(a) does not purport to give the kind of relief which
defendant here seeks, to wit: the right to a dismissal
of the case.
The two cases cited and relied upon extensively by
defendant, Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
279 U.S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355 and Herb v. Pitcarirn, 324 U.S.
117, 65 S. Ct. 459, do not relate to a consideration of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens or its application to
the F.E.L.A., cases.
In the Douglas case a New York statute was involved. There is no similar statute in the State of Utah.
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The case set forth in Appendix ''A'' of this brief,
and Leet v. Union Pac, R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P.
2d 42 (cert. den. 65 S. Ct. 1403), distinguish the Dou.glas
case and hold it inapplicable. It is to be noted that the
Douglas case was decided in 1929 and the cases relied
upon by plaintiff herein were decided at a much later
date. The Kepner case was decided in 1941; the Miles
case in 1942 and the Gulf Oil Company case in 1947.
Defendant's discussion of the Miles, Kepner and
Gulf Oil Company cases amounts merely to an assertion
by it that the United States Supreme Court did not
mean what it said in those cases. There is no basis
for defendant's statement that the language quoted
from the Gulf Oil Company case at page 46 of appellant's
brief relates only to actions in the federal courts. The
language is not so limited and the Miles case there cited
does not concern in any way an action in the federal
courts.
A reading of the Miles and Kepner cases discloses
that the equitable doctrine therein asserted by the railroads seeking an injunction is the same in principle as
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it being based on
vexation and harrassmen t.
In the case of Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co.,
...... U. S ......., 70 S. Ct. 26, 27, 28, the United States
Supreme Court on November 7, 1949, concluded that the
choice of forum given by Section 6 of the ·F.E.L.A., was
a substantive right extended employees who came within
the provisions of the F.E.L.A. That case confirmed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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holdings in the cases heretofore cited by ~ppellant! See
Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 168 Fed. 2d 812; Peter~
sen v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co .., 110 Utah 514,
175 P. 2d 744.
In the Boyd case the petitioner was injured in the
course of his duties as an employee of the railroad! On
two occasions he had signed an agreement stipulating
that if his claim ~ould not be settled and he elected to
sue, such suit would be com~epced within the county or
district where he resided at the time of his injqries,
or i~ the cou:pty or dis·trict where his injuries were sus~
tained and not elsewhere. The Supreme Court held
that this agreement was void. The court stated:

" • * * We hold th&.t petitioner's right to
bring the suit in any eligible forum: is a right of
sufficient substantiality to be included within the
Congressional mandate of Section 5 of the Liability ~ct: 'Any contract, r-qle, regulation, or device
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall
be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself
from any liability created by this Act, shall to
that extent be void * * *.' The contract before us
is therefore void.',.
The court further stated:
"The right to select the forum granted in
Section 6 is a substantial right. It would thwart
the express purpose of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act to s·anction defeat of that right by
the device at bar."
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For the convenience of the Court we are setting forth
in Appendix '' B '' of this brief the opinion of the United
States Supren1e Court in full.
The force of this language and holding can readily
be recognized when we consider the statement made by
the United States Supreme Court in the case of United
States v. National City Lines, Inc. et al., 334 U. S. 573,
68 S. Ct. 1169, 1181, 92 L. Ed. 1584, wherein it was said:
''Finally, both appellees and the District
Court have placed much emphasis upon this
Court's recent decisions applying the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and in some instances ex~
tending the scope of its application. Whatever
may be the scope of its previous application or of
its appropriate extension, the doctrine is not a
principle of universal applicability, as those decisions uniformly recognize. At least one invariable,
limiting principle may be stated. It is that whenever Congress has vested courts with jurisdiction
to hear a;nd determine causes and has inv·ested
complaining litigants with a right of choice among
them which is inconsistent with the exercise by
those courts of discretionary power to defeat the
choice so made, the doctrine can have no effect.
Baltimore ~ 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62
8. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed .. 28, 136 A..L..'R. 1222,· Miles v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 62 8. Ct.
827, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A..L.R. 1104. The question
whether such a right has been given is usually
the crux of the problem.. It is one not to be an-
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swered by such indecisive inquiries as whether
the v·enue or jurisdictional statute is labeled a
'special' or a 'general' one. Nor is it to be
determined merely by the court's view that mprplicability of the doctrine would serve the ends of
justice in the particular case. It is rather to be
decided, upon consideration of aU the relevant
matermls, by whether the legislative purpose and
the effect of the language 'USed to achieve it were to
vest the power of choice in the plaintiff or to confer power upon the courts to qualify hi's selection.''

At page 42 of its brief defendant contends that the
Supreme Court of the 8tate of Utah in its order in
cases Nos. 7326, 7327 and 7328, entitled The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a corporation,
v. The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the
Judges thereof, held that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was an inherent power in the trial courts
of this state.
The Supreme Court knows the reasoning back of
its order, but as it was understood by us, the sole ruling
of the court in those cases was that the extraordinary
writs sought by the railroad company were not proper
remedies in the case and ruled solely upon that basis.
The defendant cites cases from M·assachusetts and
Illinois contending that the rule of forum non conveniens
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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applied in those states should also be applied in Utah.
Those states apparently do not have constitutional provisions and statutes similar to those in the State of
Utah and hence those decisions are not applicable here.
Appellant in his brief has already cited cases from state~
having provisions of constitutions and statutes similar
to the State of Utah and have held that in view of such
provisions the doctrine of forwn non conveniens wa~
not applicable to their courts.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment ap..,

pealed from should be reversed and the Court's order
dismissing plaintiff's .action vacated, set aside and held
for naught and the matter referred to the Third Judicial District Court for trial in accordance with the laws
and statutes of the State of Utah and the United States
of America.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorneys for Plaintiff and A.tppellant
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APPENDIX "A"

STATE ex rei. SOUTHERN RY. CO. v.
MAYFIELD, Judge.
STATE ex rei. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v.
MURPHY, Judge.
NOS.

41461, 41558.

Supreme Court of Missouri, en Bane.
Oct. 10, 1949.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 14, 1949.

224 S. W. 2d 105.
Original proceedings in mandamus by the State of
Missouri on the relation of the Southern Railway Company against W~aldo C. Mayfield, Judge of the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis, and his successors, as
Presiding Judge of the court, and a like proceeding by
the State on the relation of the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Company against the Honorable
David J. Murphy, Judge of the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis, and his successors, as Presiding
Judge of the court, to compel the use of discretion in
passing on motions by the relators to dismiss actions
by nonresidents against relators under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The motions were grounded
solely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Writs were quashed by the Supreme Court, Tipton,
J., on the ground that the trial judge of a circuit court
could not in the exercise of judicial discretion dismiss
such an action on the sole ground of forum non conveniens.
These two cases involve identical issues and for
that reason they were consolidated for argument before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this court. They are original proceedings in maridamm;
to compel the trial court to use discretion in passing
on relators' motions to dismiss these actions brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The trial
court (William L. Mason, deceased) denied the motions
on the sole ground that in his opinion the court had nt)
jurisdiction or discretion to entertain or grant them.
Relator Southern Railway Company was sued by
Lelia M. Blevins, Administratrix, in the circuit court
of the city of St. Louis for $100,000 for the death of he1;
husband, based on the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. This relator filed a motion to dismiss this actidn
on the ground of inappropriate forum Within the doctrine
of foru.m non conveniens. This motion alleged that the
plaintiff was a resident of Tennessee and was appointed
administratrix of the estate of her husband by a Tennessee probate court, and that her husband was also a resident of that state at the time of his death. The motion
iurther stated that this relator was a Virginia corporation and that the alleged acts ()f negligence took place
near the boundary line between the states of Virginia
and Tennessee, some 700 miles from St. Louis. It further
emphasized the added expense of trying the case lit St.
Louis rather than at or near the p1ace the alleged
cause of action arose and where the parties arid witnesses resided.
Floyd P. Seachris filed suit in the circuit court of
St. Louis against the relator, the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for alleged injuries he received
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at Waynoka, Oklahoma. This relator also filed a motior.t
to dismiss that action under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. The facts alleged in this motion are similar
to the facts alleged by the relator, the Southern Railway
Corporation, except in this instance it is alleged that
Waynoka is 647 miles from St. Louis.
As previously stated, the trial court denied these
motions. The ground for the denial of each of these
motions was that the ''Court has no jurisdiction or discretion to entertain or grant such a motion.''
The sole· question before us is : May a trial judge
of a circuit court of this state exercise his judicial discretion in determining whether to retain or relinquish
jurisdiction of a case brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act when a motion to dismiss on the
sole ground of forum non conveniens is presented before
him for a ruling¥
In the case of Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839, I.e. 841-842,
the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §51 et seq., we have held
that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on
the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because
the special venue act under which those cases are brought
was believed to require it. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed. 28, 136
A.L.R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S.
698, 62 S. Ct. 827,86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104. Those
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to
other cases governed by the general venue statutes."
That court upheld the Federal District Court of
New York, 62 F. Supp. 219, when it dismissed the
plaintiff's suit on the ground that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens applied. But that action was brought
under the general venue statute. It was not a Federal
Employers' Liability case.
In the case of Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S. Ct.
944, 945, 93 L. Ed. 901, l.c. 903 and 904-905, the Supreme
Court of the United States said:

''Prior to the current revision of title 28 of thJ
United States Code, forum non conveniens was not available in Federal Employers' Liability Act suits. Baltimore&; 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 86 L. Ed. 28,
62 S. Ct. 6, 136 A.L.R. 1222 (1941); Miles v. Illinois C.
R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 62 S. Ct. 827,
146 A.L.R. 1104 (1942); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U. S. 501, 505, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 1060, 67 S. Ct. 839
(1947). The new Code, however, provides that 'For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have
been brought.' This is § 1404 (a)."
''Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper
forum; § 1404 (a) of the Code deals with the right to
transfer an action properly brought. The two section::;
deal with two separate and distinct problems. Section
1404 (a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right
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granted in § '6 of the Li~bility Act or elsewhere to bring
suit in a particular district. An action m~y still be
brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might
have been brought previously.
''The Code, therefore, does not repeal § 6 of the
F~deral Employers' Liability Act.''
Section 1404 (a), supra, became effective September
1, 1948, and applies only to civil suits brought in the
federal co~rts. It has no applicatiQp tq feqer~l Employer$' J.;iabilit! s11its bFQllg~t in st~te cpurt~. W~
have no machinery to transfer these two cas~s, one tq
the state or federal courts of Tennessee and the other
to the courts of Oklahoma. Relators do- not contend that
.,
this section applies to the problem before us. They do
not ask that the two suits in q~estion be transferred
but they rely upon the common l~w doct~ine of forun~
non conveniens which calls- for a dismissal of the action.
''While the subst~nt~al factors to be . we!ghed ·in
determini:Q.g ~ mQtio~ under Sect~P,n +~04 ( ~) ~ay b~
similar to those involve<} in a conslqeration of forum
non conveniens, yet it seems clear that transfer under
Section 1404 (a) is something more than and somewhat
different from dismissal under forum non conveniens.
In the first place, the procedure to be followed in affirmatively invoking the two remedies is drastically different.
Under Section 1404 (a) a case is not dis~i~sed but
merely transferred to the more convenie:q.t forum; "!lnder
forum non conveniens a c~se is dismissed and must be
instituted anew in the more convenient forum, carrying
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with it the inherent and jeopardous hazard of being
barred therein by the statute of limitations. The danger
of having the action barred in such a manner was one
bf the principal reasons for Mr. Justice Black's dissent
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 1947, 330 U.S. 501, 516,
67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055.
''The doctrine of forum DO If. conveniens has been
held inapplicable to cases instituted under 'speeial v~nu~'
statutes, such as actions arising under the Feder~l Erpployers' Liability Act and the anti-trust laws. Such
types of cases may be transferred under Section 1404 (a),
however. Ex parte Collett, 1949, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S. Ct..
944 (959); United States v. National City Lines, 1949,
337 U.S. 78, 69 S. Ct. 955 ( 959). In this respect, then,
the two remedies are also different." U.S.D.C., Del~
(Rodney, J.); Cinema Amu.sements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.,
June 10, 1949, 85 F. Supp. 319, 322.
Thus, with ref~rence to Federal Employer~' Liabi~
ity actions brought in state courts the law is the same
now as it was before Section 1404 (a) was enacted.
The case of Baltimore and Ohio. R. Co. v. Kepn~r,
314 U. S. 44, 86 L. Ed. 28, 62 S. Ct. 6, I.e. 9~10, was
a suit brought in a state court of Ohio against an injured
resident employe of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
to enjoin him from prosecuting a suit he instituted in
the United States District Court of New York under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for an injury he received in the State of Ohio. The Supreme Court of
Ohio denied the injunction. Upon application of the
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railroad, the Supreme Court of the United States issued
its writ of certiorari to review the Ohio decision. In
affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
that court said :
"That real contention of petitioner is that despite the
admitted venue respondent is acting in a vexatious
and inequitable manner in maintaining the federal court
suit in a distant jurisdiction when a convenient and
suitable forum is at respondent's doorstep."
We read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio
to express the view that if it were not for Section 6 of
the Employers' Liability Act the requested injunction
would be granted on the undisputed facts of the petition.
Section 6 establishes venue for an action in the federal
courts. As such venue is a privilege created by federal
statute and claimed by respondent the Supreme Court
of Ohio felt constrained by the Supremacy Clause to
treat Section 6 as decisive of the issue. It is clear that
the allowance or denial of this federal privilege is a
matter of federal law, not a mat,ter of state law under
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 72, 58 S. Ct.
817, 819, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487. Its correct
decision depends upon a construction of a federal act.
Consequently the action of a state court must be in accord
with the federal statute and the federal rule as to its
application rather than state statute, rule or policy.
''Petitioner presses upon us the argument that the
action of Congress gave an injured railway employet_~
the privilege of extended venue, subject to the usual
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powers of the state to enjoin what in the judgment of
the state courts would be considered an improper use
of that privilege. This results, says petitioner, because
the Act does not in terms exclude this state power. As
courts of equity admittedly possessed this power before
the enactment of Section 6, the argument continues, it
is not to be lightly inferred that the venue privilege
was in disregard of this policy. But the federal courta
have felt they could not interfere with suits in far
federal districts where the inequity alleged was based
only on inconvenience. There is no occasion to distinguish
between the power and the propriety of its exercise
in this instance since the limits of the two are here
co-extensive. The privilege was granted because the
general venue provisions worked injustices to employees.
It is obvious that no state statute could vary the venue
and we think equally true that no state court may interfere with the privilege, for the benefit of the carrier or
the national transp<>rtation system, on the ground of
inequity based on cost, inconvenience or harrassment.
When the section was enacted it filled the entire field
of venue in federal courts. A privilege of venue granted
by the legislative body which created this right of
action cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience
or expense~ If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legi8lative, a court followed in securing the amendment of
April 5, 1910, for the benefit of employees.''
The case of Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315
U. S. 698, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 62 S. Ct. 827, I.e. 830-831,
146 A.L.R. 1104, was a suit to review the action of the
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Tennessee Court of Appeals which had enjoined the
plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, froni prosecuting a
suit under the Federal En1ployers' Liability Act· in the
Circuit court of St. Louis, Missouri, for the death of her
husband which occurred in Tennessee while working for
the railroad. In ruling the case the court said :
''In the legislative history of section 6, the provision
that removal may not be had from a 'State court of
competent jurisdiction' was added to the House bill
on the floor of the Senate and later accepted by the
House, in order to assure a hearing to the employee in
a state court. Words were simultaneously adopted recognizing the jurisdiction of the state courts by providing
that the federal jurisdiction should he concurrent. The
venue of state court suits was lef.t to the practice of
the forum. The opportunity to present causes of action
arising under the F.E.L.A. in the state courts came;
however, not from the state law but from the federal.
By virtue of the Constitution, the courts of the several
states must remain open to such litigants on the saml~
basis ,that they are open to litigants with causes of action
springing from a different source. This is so because
the Federal Constitution makes the laws of the United
States the supreme law of the land, binding on every
citizen and every court and enforceable wherever jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose * * *
''Since the existence of the cause of action and the
privilege of vindicating rights under the F.E.L.A. in
state courts spring from federal law, the right to sue
in state courts of proper venue where their jurisdiction
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is adequate is of the same quality as the right to sue in
federal courts. It is no more subject to interference
by state action than was the federal venue in the Kepner
case * ~ •.
''The permission granted by Congress to sue in
state courts may be exercised only where the carrier is
found doing business. If suits in federal district courts
at those points do not unduly burden interstate commerce, suits in similarly located state courts cannot be
burdensome. As Congress has permitted both the state
and federal suits, its determination that the carriers
must bear the incidental burden is a determination that
the state courts may not treat the normal expense and
inconvenience of trial in permitted places, such as the
one selected here, as inequitable and unconscionable.''
Thus, it is clear that under the Kepner and Miles
cases, supra, a state court cannot dismiss a Federal Employers' Liability case solely under the forum non conveniens doctrine.
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act, as interp_reted by Kepner, increases the number of p!laces where the
defendant may be sued and makes him accept the plaintiff's choice" (Italics ours). Gulf Oil Corporation v.
Gilbert, supra, 67 S. Ct. 839, I.e. 842.

Relators rely mainly upon the case of Douglas v.
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 73 L. Ed.
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747, 49 S. Ct. 355. In that case a resident of Connecticut
brought a suit in a state court of New York under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act against the defendant,
a Connecticut corporation, for personal injuries inflicted
in Connecticut. The trial court dismissed the action
under a statute which it held gave it discretion in suits
brought by non-resident plaintiffs. The trial court action
was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, 248
N.Y. 580, 1'62 N.E. 532. This was the -statute in question : ''An action against a foreign corporation may be
maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a nonresident, in one of the following cases only: • * * 4.
Where a foreign corporation is doing business within this State.'' Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1780.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that
this statute was not in violation of Article 4, Section
2, of the Constitution of the United States, as discriminating between citizens of New York and citizens of other
states when construed as using the word ''resident'' in
the strict primary sense of one actually living in the
place for a time, irrespective of domicile. Such was the
construction placed upon this statute by the New York
Court of Appeals. It also held that state courts are not
required to entertain suits under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act but are empowered to do so.
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We do not think this case sustains the relatOJ.'.
The con1mon la.w doctrine of forum non conveniens is
not even mentioned in the opinion. In the first place,
:Missouri does not have a statute similar to the New
York statute which the courts of that state have held
to give them discretionary power to dismiss an action
brought by a non-resident as distinguished from a citizen
of another state. Also, Missouri permits citizens of this
state to file Federal Employers' Liability cases in its
courts. To deny the same privilege to citizens of another
state would violate Article 4, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States.
Relators also rely upon the case of Chambers v.
Baltimore &!; Ohio Railroad Co., 207 U. S. 142, 28 S. Ct.
34, I.e. 36, 52 L. Ed. 143. In that case the wife of an
employe brought suit in a state court of Ohio for injuries
received by her husband in Pennsylvania which caused
his death. Both the husband and wife were residents of
the latter state. The court held that an Ohio statute
which permits suits in Ohio state courts for wrongful
death occurring in another state only when the decedent
was a citizen of Ohio did not violate the Privileges and
Immunity Clause of the Federal Constitution (Article
4, Section 2). In ruling the case, that court said:
"The courts were open in such cases to plaintiffs
who were citizens of other states if the deceased wa::;
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a citizen of Ohio; they were closed to plaintiffs who
were citizens of Ohio if the deceased was a citizen of
another state. So far as the parties to the litigation
are concerned, the state, by its laws, made no discrimination based on citizenship, and offered precisely the same
privileges to citizens of other states which it allowed
to its own. There is, therefore, at lease a literal conformity with the requirements of the Constitution."
The opinion in the Chambers case deals only with
the constitutionality of a state statute; it does not mention the Federal Employers' Liability Act nor the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This state does not
have any such statute. We fail to see its applicability
to the issue before us.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not
compel the courts of this state to hear cases arising
under that act, but it empowers our courts to do so.
Since Missouri does allow its citizens to maintain
Federal Employers' Liability ,actions in its courts (see
the many such cases listed in the Missouri Digest, Ma::;ter and Servant, 85), it follows that not to allow citizen8
of other states the right to file Federal Employers' Liability suits in our state courts would violate Article 4,
Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States.
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The relators do not co:ntenq that the circuit court
<>f St. Louis does not have jurisdiction of the parties
or of the subject matter of these two suits, or that
there is any state statute that would prohibit maintaining
these suits in our state courts, but their sole contention
is that the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
should be open to them in these cases. Under the Kepner
and Miles cases, sup:va, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not open to relators in the two Federal Employers' Liability cases in question.
Respondents also contend that under our Constitution and statutes the doctrine of forum non conveniens
cannot be recognized in Missouri. Since we have already
ruled the trial court had no discretion in Federal Employers' Liability cases, it is not necessary to discuss
the Missouri law upon that subject.
From what we have said,· it follows that our writ
should be quashed. It is so ordered.
ERNEST

M.

TIPTON,

Judge

All concur.
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APPENDIX "B"

BOYD vs. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO.,
70S. Ct. 26
No.17.
Argued Oct. 11, 1949.
Decided Nov. 7, 1949.
PER CURIAM.
In issue here is the validity of a contract restricting the choice of venue for an action based upon the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. 1 Petitioner was injured in the course of his duties as an employee of
respondent railroad in November, 1946. Twice during
the following month petitioner was advanced fifty dollars by respondent. On each of these occasions petitioner signed an agreement stipulating that if his claim
could not be settled and he elected to sue, ''such suit
shall be commenced within the county or district where
I resided at the time my injuries were sustained, or
in the county or district where my injuries were sustained
1 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51, 45 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 51.
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and not elsewhere. " 2 Although this provisiOn defined
the available forun1 as either the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, :Michigan, or the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of ~fichigan, petitioner
brought an action in the Superior Court of Cook County,
Illinois. To enjoin petitioner's prosecution of the Illinois
case, respondent instituted this suit. The Michigan Circuit Court held that the contract restricting the choice
of venue was void and dismissed the suit. The Michigan
Supreme Court reversed, 1948, 321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W.
2d 120.
Certiorari was granted, 1949, 337 U. S. 923, '69
S. Ct. 1166, because the federal and state courts which
have considered the issue have reached conflicting
results;'l We agree with those courts which have held
2 The agreement also provided that the sums advanced would
be deducted from whatever settlement or recovery petitioner
finally achieved. As to this, the proviso in Sec. 5 of the Liability
Act specifies "That in any action brought against any such common
carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act,
such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed
or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have
been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on
account of the injury or death for which said action was 'brought."
Referring to this provision, and interpreting a contract similar to
the one here involved, at least one federal court has held that
"The contract to waive the venue provisions is of no effect * * *
because there was no consideration for it.'' Akerly v. New York
Cent. R. Co., 6 Cir., 1948, 168 F. 2d 812, 815.
sIn accord with the decision below are: Roland v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co., D.C.N.D. Ill. 1946, 65 F. Supp. 630; Herrington
v. Thompson, D.C.W.D. Mo. 1945, 61 F. Supp. 903; ·Clark v. Lowden, D.C.D. Minn. 1942, 48 F. Supp. 261; Detwiler v. Chicago, R.
I. & P. R. Co., D.C.D. Minn. 1936, 15 F. Supp. 541; Detwiler v.
Lowden, 1936, 198 Minn. 185, 188, 269 N.W. 367, 369, 838, 107
A.L.R. 1054, 1059. In conflict with the ruling before us are:
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 1949, 17 4 F. 2d 556, petition for certiorari denied 70 S. Ct ... , infra; Akerly v. New York
Cent. R. Co., 6 Cir., 1948, 168 F. 2d 812; Fleming v. Husted,
D.C.D. Iowa 1946, 68 F. Supp. 900; Sherman v. Pere Marquette
R. Co., D;C.N.D. Ill. 1945, 62 F. Supp. 590; Peterson v. Ogden
Union Railway & Depot Co., 1946, 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d 7 44;
cf. Porter v. Fleming, D.C.D. Minn. 1947, 74 F. Supp. 378.
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that contracts limiting the choice of venue are void as
conflicting with the Liability Act.
(1) Section 6 of the Liability Act provides that
"Under this Act an action. may be brought in a district
court of the United States, in the district of the residence
of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at
the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States under this Act shaH
be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
States, ,and no case arising under this Act and brought
in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any court of the United States." It is not
disputed that respondent is liable to suit in Cook County,
Illinois, in accordance with this provision. We hold
that petitioner's right to bring the suit in any eligible
forum is a right of sufficient substantiality to be included
within the Congressional mandate of Section 5 of the
Liability Act: ''Any contract, rule, regulation, or device
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to
enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any
liability created by this Act, shali to that extent be
void * • * '' The contract before us is therefore void.
Any other result would be inconsistent with
Duncan v. Thompson, 1942, 315 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 422,
86 L. Ed. 575. That opinion reviewed the legislative
history and concluded that ''Congress wanted Section
5 to have the full effect that its comprehensive phraseology implies." 315 U.S. at page 6, 62 S. Ct. at page 424.
(2)
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In that case '!ls in this, the contract before the Court
was signed after the injury occurred. The court below,
in holding that an agreement delimiting venue should
be enforced if it was reached after the accident, disregarded Duncan.
(3) The vigor and validity of the Duncan decision
was not impaired by Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.;
1948, 332 U.S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. Ed. 242. We
there distinguished a full compromise enabling the
parties to settle their dispute without litigation, which
we held did not contravene the Act, from a device which
obstructs the right of the Liability Act plidntiff to
secure the maximum recovery if he should elect judicial
trial of his cause! And nothing in Ex parte Collett, 1949,
337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, affects the initial choice of
venue afforded Liability Act plaintiffs. We stated
expressly that the section of the Judicial Code there
involved, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404 (a), 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1404
(a), "does not limit or otherwise modify any right
granted in Section 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to
bring suit in a particular district. An action may still
be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it
might have been brought previously." 337 U. S. at page
60, 69 S. Ct. at page 947.
The right to select the forum granted in Section 6
is a substantial right. It would thwart the express pur4 See Krenger supra note 3, 174 F. 2d at page 558; 174 F.
2d at page 561 (concurring opinion of L. Hand, C. J.); Akerly,
supra note 3, 168 F. 2d at page 815; Peterson, supra note 3, 110
Utah at page 579, 175 P. 2d at page 747.
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pose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sanction
defeat of that right by the device at bar.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice JACKSON
concur in the result but upon the grounds stated by
Chief Judge Hand in K renger v .. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
2 Cir., 1949, 174 F. 2d 556, at page 560.
Mr. Justice DouGLAS and Mr. Justice MINTON took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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